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1. MOTIVATION AND PREVIOUS RESEARCH
The field of macroeconomics is divided by basic textbooks into long run
and short run. According to the consensus by studying business cycles, it is
important to take into consideration nominal price and wage rigidities (short
run), hereby the output movements are in great part influenced by the shocks
of aggregate demand components. If we want to analyze phenomena in a
longer run, we can ignore rigidities, the flexibility of the prices and wages
can be presumed (long run), an the outcomes of the economy are determined
by the supply side. Economists who want to understand the long run per-
formance of the economies, beside analyzing the institutional settings (e.g.
Acemoglu, Johnson, Robinson [2005]) examine the mechanism of the tech-
nological change (e.g. Romer [1990]) and the determinants of the factor sup-
ply.
The chapters of the present dissertation also wants to analyze the prop-
erties, the determinants of the long run capital and labor supply, and their
macoeconomic consequences. A common feature in the three chapters is
that in explaining factor supply they build on the heterogeneity of the agents.
However, the approach of the chapters differs. In the second chapter we sim-
ulate a new theoretical agent-based model in order to understand the capital
supply, but it can be viewed as an numerical example which is not calibrated
to any real economy. Contrarily, the life cycle model applied in the third
chapter and the overlapping generations model in the fourth is the applica-
tion of well-known modelling tradition, they are calibrated to the Hungarian
economy and investigate the effects of the Hungarian social security pension
system and demography.
As we mentioned previously, in explaining the saving behavior the hetero-
geneity of the households plays an important role. A usually applied approach
separates people into two groups: those whose behavior can be described
by some version of the traditional utility maximizing rational expectations
model (permanent income hypothesis) proposed in it’s original form by Irv-
ing Fisher [1930], and those who seem to behave in a purely consumption-
oriented manner, largely disregarding the future consequences (Hall, Mishkin
[1982], Laibson [1997]). The later variant of the former approach takes into
account the undiversifiable risk of income and the risk aversion ability of
the consumer (Carroll [1996]). According to the buffer-stock saving model,
households with prudent preferences and with considerable undiversifiable
labor income risks strive to maintain a buffer-stock wealth which can be char-
acterized by a asset-income ratio. All the three consumer types seem the-
oretically and empirically plausible, which raises the question: under what
conditions can they coexist and what consequences their symbiosis has on
the aggregate capital supply?
Agent-based models, where heterogeneity of the agents and learning plays
an important role, have been established in economics for at least 20 years
now (Tesfatsion [2001], [2006]). In agent-based macro models households
save, generally, by following some rule (heuristics), which may be devised as
a bounded rationally approximation of the traditional behaviours, mentioned
in the previous paragraph, but the rules don’t compete with each other. There-
fore, in the second chapter we analyse the capital supply with the help of an
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agent-based model, in which the three aforementioned consumer types (per-
manent income, prudent and short-sighted types) ”struggle for life”. With
the model we investigate how the selection pressure influence the proportion
of them and how it will affect the macroeconomic outcomes? Our aim is to
give some advice to agent-based macro models, what kind of saving rule they
should suppose and what consequences they have.
Another plausible grouping of population with regard to capital supply
since Modigliani, Brumberg [1954] follows the life cycle: young and old
households’ saving behavior differ because they realize different incomes
compared to their planned consumptions. In developed economies social
security pension systems partially substitute the labor incomes in old ages,
which also affects their saving behavior (Feldstein [1995]). Households with
different age display different behavior not only concerning their capital sup-
ply, but also their labor supply (Blundell et al. [2011]), which is commonly re-
lated to the functioning of the pension system, too (Gruber, Wise eds. [2002],
Wallenius [2013]).
In explaning Hungarian capital- and labor supply in the long run we
also assign particular importance to the demographic process of the soci-
ety and the pension system. Hungarian researchers (Augusztinovics [2005],
Augusztinovics-Köllo˝ [2007], Augusztinovics, Gyombolai, Máté [2008]) in-
vestigated mainly the other way of the labor supply-pension relationship: they
explored how employment patterns affect pensions. In explaining how the
pensions effect labor supply, the literature follows two approaches. The first
(Gruber, Wise eds. [2002], Cseres-Gergely [2007] Cseres-Gergely [2015])
one estimates reduced form econometric models in order to reveal how in-
centives of the pension system influence labor market activity. The present
study follows – according to our knowledge in Hungary firstly – the tradi-
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tion of the other approach (Rust, Phelan [1997], French [2005]) which cali-
brates/structurally estimates micro-based life cycle labor supply model with
dynamically optimizing agents and simulates how changes in the pension
rules affect behaviour. In the third chapter we build a life cycle labor sup-
ply model where incentives are mainly influenced by the pension system and
calibrate it to the Hungarian males’ labor age-profile. With the model at hand
we investigate the following questions: how different parametric reforms of
the Hungarian pension system will change the aggregate labor supply of the
males in the long run? How will they reallocate labor across cohorts in the
long run? The partial equilibrium model is also an important piece of the next
chapter’s general equilibrium model.
The incentive effects of the demography and pensions system have fur-
ther macroeconomic and budget consequences, which is also worthwhile to
reveal. The phenomenon of demographic transition will affect the Hungarian
economic growth and the finances of the social security pension system in
following decades. Therefore, in the fourth chapter we analyze how the de-
mographic transition will influence the sustainability pension system and how
parametric pension reforms alter the picture. In addition, we also simulate the
macroeconomic effects of the elderly society and the reforms.
In Hungary more economists studied the sustainability of the pension sys-
tem (Orbán, Palotai [2005], Orbán, Palotai [2006], Holtzer szerk. [2010]).
All the aforementioned models – in contrast to the present study – determine
the path of the macroeconomic variables according to ”experts’ estimation”,
ignore the labor supply and saving reactions, so they don’t take into account
the possible household responses that demographic transition and pension re-
forms can trigger. In the long run, however, households’ reactions and the
macroeconomic feedback effects may be important. Among the traditional
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macroeconomic models the most suitable to analyse the demographic transi-
tion and the pension reforms are the overlapping generations models, (Dia-
mond [1965], Auerbach és Kotlikoff [1987]), in addition, they can take into
account behaviourial responses and their macroecomic consequences. In the
chapter we study the effects of the demographic transition and pension re-
forms with and Auerbach-Kotlikoff-type model, calibrated to the Hungarian
data.
In Hungary the model of Simonovits [2009] with overlapping cohorts and
demographic transition illustrates how parametric reforms influence the mea-
sures of sustainability and the cohorts’ consumption along the demographic
transition. The modelling technique contains more innovations: the house-
holds utility depends on the relative change of consumption, not the level,
the size of the family changes along the life cycle, but – in contrast to the
present study – the labor supply is constant and the general equilibrium con-
sequences of the demographic process don’t affect the real wages an the inter-
est rate. Fehr [2000] also uses an Auerbach-Kotlikoff-type model to explore
the effects of the German demographic transition, and simulates the current
pension reforms afterwards. He examines how the reforms change the path
of the macroeconomy, the welfare of the agents and the sustainability of the
pension system. The economy is, however, – in contrast to our approach –
closed, and hence doesn’t track the path of the foreign debt. The openness
plays an important role in the model of Fehr, Jokisch, Kotlikoff [2005], who
show that incorporating China into the world economy alters drastically the
sustainability of pension system in the developed countries: its abundant cap-
ital supply rises the real wages per efficient unit in the long run, and hereby
alleviates the burden, the pension system entails to the government finances.
We are also concerned how the financing need of the Hungarian pension sys-
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tem evolves in an open economy, but instead of using a multiregion world
economy, we use a small open economy. Less frequently can we find small,
open economies in the literature. De la Croix, Pierrard, Sneesens [2012]) use
that type of model as a contrast to their closed economy version, but with
perfectly elastic capital supply, so the factor prices remain unchanged. In the
present study the the capital supply is not perfectly elastic as the interest rate
premium depends positively on the foreign debt rate.
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2. APPLIED METHODS
Savings types: an evolutionary-adaptive approach
The production-primary income distribution side of the model follows Be-
wley [1980]. The model has a simple production side based on neoclassical
assumptions concerning production, labour and capital service markets. Both
types plan their own behavioral rule as follows. The permanent income type
consumer try to figure out their total lifetime wealth, and intend to achieve
perfect consumption smoothing, but according to her degree of optimism she
may consume a bit less or a bit more. She uses statistical learning rules to
forecast returns on capital and labour income. The prudent consumers have
a desired wealth-income ratio (buffer stock) and they consume accommodate
their consumption to it. Short-sighted consumers determine their reference
level, which is the highest consumption among their neighbours, but they can
also depart from it according to their optimism. These plans may not be feasi-
ble. In this case the potential debtors meet in the credit market the consumers
who have more resources, than their planned consumption. (The debt can-
not exceed a given debt constraint). After lending, the creditors use the rest
of their resources to accumulate physical capital. There exists also a social
adaptation-selection mechanism that favours the type of behavior that obtains
more in terms of accumulated consumption. This mechanism results in mod-
ifications in the composition of the three types, thus the relative proportion
of them is changing continuously. The mechanism also support spread of the
optimism and buffer stock value of the successful agents.
We simulated the model and investigated how the competition among the
types – the parameter which determines how important is the long run con-
sumption in the selection process – affect the capital supply, the proportion
of the types and behavior of the economy (it’s ergodicity and it’s stationarity).
Life cycle labor supply and social security
The third chapter describes the average profiles of the life cycle working
hours of Hungarian males in the period 1999-2009 with the help of Hungarian
Labor Force Survey. It also describes the components of the Hungarian old
age and disability pension system, which may have had influence on the life
cycle labor supply of the males, and sketches the age profile of the pensioners
and the retirement behavior by (old age and disability) pension schemes in
parallel with the labor force activity.
After describing the main tendencies of life cycle working hours and re-
tirement of the Hungarian males, it uses a microfounded life cycle labor sup-
ply model to simulate the effects of different parametric pension reforms on
the life cycle labor supply. The consumers, who belong to 18 five-years co-
horts over age 26 and three different education level, maximize their life cycle
utility, along which they take into consideration their survival chances. They
make a consumption-saving and a labor supply decision, and after a common
retirement age they give up work and retire. Their labor and capital income is
devoted in their active worklife to consumption, asset accumulation, capital
and labor income taxes, consumption taxes and social security contribution.
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At the beginning of their life they don’t have any wealth and they don’t plan
to leave any bequest at the end of the maximum lifespan. Their productiv-
ity, which determines their real wages, follows an exogenous age profile, and
along their labor supply decision they take into account the influence of the
earnings on the value of later pensions. At the beginning of their pension life
they receive a pension which is proportional to their average life cycle net
wage income, later their pension partially follows the average growth rate of
the productivity. The model is calibrated according to the average values of
the 1999-2009 period of the Hungarian economy. The productivity profiles
of the three groups with different education level is estimated on the Hun-
garian Household Budget Survey data between years 1998 and 2008 with a
pooled Heckman’s selection model. The preference parameters of the con-
sumers are structurally estimated with the help of the Hungarian Labor Force
Survey data.
In the model simulation we investigated how parametric pension reforms
(reduction of the accrual rate, increase in the retirement age, enlargement of
reference period in calculating the initial pension value, change in the index-
ation) alter the life cycle labor supply of groups with different educational
attainment and the aggregate employment.
Demographic transition, economic growth and the sustainability of
social security
In the fourth chapter we simulate a general equilibrium model, which
contains 18 five-years cohorts over age 26, the influence of the Hungarian de-
mographic transition and various parametric pension reforms on the financ-
ing need of the pension system and the path of the macroeconomic variables
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between 2006 and 2070. The size of the youngest cohort is determined by
fertility and migration, the size of the elder cohorts is determined by survival
probabilities and migration. The survival probabilities change continuously,
and the size of the cohorts’ follows the demographic projection of Hablicsek
[2010].
The problem of the households is almost the same as in the third chap-
ter. The most notable difference is that they accumulate three type of assets:
government bonds, physical capital and foreign assets. The initial value of
their pension is the constant fraction of its valorized net wage incomes in the
”active years”. The firms use capital and effective labor in producing output,
the labor-augmenting technology evolves according to a exogenously given
rate. Government collect revenues from proportional taxation and by issu-
ing government bonds, and spend it on transfers, pensions, government con-
sumption, interest payments and redemption. The consumptions taxes allow
the government to keep government debt to GDP ratio at a given level, and
the GDP-proportional deficit of the social security shows the ”sustainability”
of the pension system. In the open economy the interest rate depends on the
world interest rate and a risk premium, which increases in the foreign debt
rate of the economy.
The initial period of the simulation is calibrated according to the average
values of the 1999-2009 period of the Hungarian economy, the preference
parameters come from the second study, the survival probabilities and the
number of the cohorts are the values from Hablicsek’s [2010] demographic
projections.
The model simulates the baseline path of the macroeconomic values (above
all the GDP, factors of production, factor prices and foreign debt rate), the sus-
tainability of the social security pension system and the present values of the
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pensions relative to the wages, as a measure of the relative old age poverty
along the demographic transition between 2006-10 and 2066-70. The sec-
ond part of the study simulates the same variables when variable parametric
pension reforms (reduction of the accrual rate, increase in the retirement age,
increase in the social security contribution rate, change in the indexation) take
place.
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3. RESULTS OF THE THESIS
Savings types: an evolutionary-adaptive approach
• When the selection pressure is high, the economy is overwhelmed al-
most entirely by prudent households. Along intermediate selection
pressure the dominance of the prudent types endures, but they are fol-
lowed by a considerable proportion of short-sighted consumers, and
when the pressure is low, the proportion of the three types is equal.
Therefore, the viability hierarchy is the following: 1. prudent, 2. short-
sighted, 3. permanent income type consumers.
• High selection pressure results in higher aggregate capital, but in some-
what lower aggregate consumption. The reason of the over-accumulation
is that higher pressure selects ”too many” prudent households who ac-
cumulate larger buffer-stock wealth.
• The tendency toward over-accumulation may be restricted by the re-
duction of the capital’s effective productivity. In other words, in peri-
ods with many and large catastrophes the over-accumulation tendency
may be overcame.
• Although higher selection pressure leads to over-accumulation, it also
has an advantage for the society, as it moderates the aggregate fluctua-
tions.
• Ruling out one type of households has the following consequences.
Without prudent households there is no capital accumulation, the short-
sighted households mitigate the over-accumulation tendencies. Perma-
nent income type consumers may crowd out short-sighted ones, but
they would have "‘positive"’ role only if the society would accumulate
too little capital.
• Debt is mainly accumulated by short-sighted households. Relaxing
borrowing constraints is conducive to even more overaccumulation, as
if owners of capital were ”exploited” by wage-earners.
Life cycle labor supply and social security
• All the parametric pension reforms changes the life cycle labor supply
in the model through two main channels. The ”wealth effect” motivates
the workers to work more if the present value of their income decreases.
According to the ”substitution effect” labor supply increases with age
if the productivity increases, or the consumer is impatient compared to
the market net interest rate. In addition to the aforementioned factors
another, non-traditional factor comes in effect. A further incentive of
work is the influence of the earnings on the value of later pensions:
the effect is stronger, if the accrual rate is higher, the reference period
is shorter, the labor income taxes and the social contribution rates are
lower, the marginal utility is higher (the consumption is lower) in the
period of retirement. The further is the period of retirement, the weaker
is the incentive, because of the impatience of the consumer and the
lower conditional survival probability of the retirement.
• If the accrual rate is decreased by 10 percentage points, the present
value of the life cycle incomes ceteris paribus decreases, which en-
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hances the labor supply at all points of the life cycle. The substitution
effect weakens the marginal incentives of work: an additional hour of
work augment the initial pension by a smaller amount. Contrasting
with the baseline path it can be seen that the substitution effect reduces
stronger the labor supply in elder ages, because of the greater probabil-
ity of survive until the pension age. The disincentives of the substitu-
tion effect is so strong in the 56-60 age group that the positive wealth
effect is almost overwhelmed.
• Increasing the normal retirement age by 5 years (one period) reduces
the expected length of the pensioner years, which ceteris paribus boost
the labor supply throughout the whole life cycle. The effect is allevi-
ated by the fact that the same amount of working hours is worked in
one more period. For all age groups pension disbursement begins one
period later. That makes the workers discount stronger the expected
pension incomes, which reduces the marginal incentives. In a result
the labor supply increases until age 45 and decreases afterwards, but
naturally, the employment rate of the earlier inactive 61-65 age group
increases considerably.
• Changing the indexation of pensions in payment from 50-50 % wage-
price indexation to price indexation decreases the present value of pen-
sion incomes because of the trend growth in real wages, which makes
the workers work more by the same proportion in all age groups (the
substitution effect is absent).
• With enlarging the reference period in calculating the initial pensions a
period of smaller productivity gets into the average wage, which in-
creases the labor supply through the wealth effect (it decreases the
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present value of pension incomes). The marginal incentives worsened
with the incorporation of the first period because all period’s weight
decreases in the average wage. As a result the employment of the
youngest age groups (until age of 35 and 45, respectively) increases,
but it decreases in the older age groups.
• Aggregating the employment changes with the help of the age dis-
tributions by Hablicsek [2010], we can evaluate the magnitude the
parametric reforms cause in employment (without general equilibrium
feedbacks). Increasing the retirement age has the most favourable ef-
fect, extending the employment by 6.9 and 5.79 % in the groups with
medium and high education level, respectively. Decreasing the accrual
rate improved the employment by 1.62 and 1.58 %, changing the index-
ation of pensions in payment by 2.27 and 2.21 % in the same groups,
and enlarging the reference period in calculating the initial pensions
has ambiguous effects.
Demographic transition, economic growth and the sustainability of
social security
• According to the simulation, the dependency ratio, measured by 61
years-old and older to 26-60 years old increases from 43 to 100 between
2006-10 and 2066-70. At the beginning of the lifespan (at age 26) the
life expectancy is 76.99 years in the 2006-2010 period, which grows
to 89.21 years by 2066-70. At age 60 the life expectancy grows from
87.58 years to 92.92 years in the same time interval.
• In the neoclassical model the GDP per efficiency capita falls by 19.98
% between 2006-2010 and 2066-2070, which means that GDP per
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capita falls short by ca. 20 % of the level it could reach by the end of the
period, if it would follow the 2.35% per year technological change (the
GDP per capita is only the 3.26-fold of it’s initial level, not the four-
fold). As a consequence of the demographic transition, the number of
efficient working hours per capita falls more, the capital per efficiency
capita falls less.
• The efficient labor supply per capita decreases by 23.32 % along the de-
mographic transition. A simple decomposing procedure shows that the
shrinkage of the working age population (population under 60) would
reduce the effective labor supply by 27.56 %, the restructuring of the
working age population toward the elder cohorts by another 1.93%.
The full effect is more moderate, thanks to the labor supply reactions
of the cohorts (over age 35, the effective working hours grow in all
cohorts), which would increase the effective labor supply by 6.17% in
itself.
• The demographic transition reduces also the consumption per efficient
unit directly and indirectly. From it’s 15.28 % shrinkage 7.86 % can
be attributed to the fact, that the consumption per capita decreases in
all cohorts under age 80. The other 7.42 % from the reduction is due
to the restructuring of the population toward the cohorts with smaller
consumption (the proportion of the cohorts under age 65 with larger
consumption reduces).
• Thanks to the lower incomes per efficient capita and despite the lower
consumption per efficient capita, the accumulated wealth per efficient
capita reduces, but only by 6.14 %. The decomposition shows that
with unchanged behaviour of the households the wealth per efficient
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capita would decrease by 25.1 % just as a consequence of demographic
transition (the weight of households with small wealth increases), but
due to the enhanced saving behaviour by age 40 to 85 the households
accumulate more wealth, which alleviates the aggregate effect.
• Because of the enhanced savings the GDP-proportional wealth of the
households increases, which reduces the GDP-proportional foreign debt.
The lower debt rate reduces the risk premium and the interest rate. The
accompanying smaller rent on capital makes the production capital-
intensive and the wages per efficiency unit larger.
• Along the demographic transition and unchanged pension parameters
the expenditures of the social security pension system grow from 11.32
% to 23.3 % of the GDP, the deficit of the social security rises from
0.67 % to 12.37% of the GDP between 2006-2010 and 2066-2070. As
a result, the government have to raise the consumption tax rate from
28.35 % to 43.07 %. The changes are unequal: the variables rise steeper
after the retirement of the Ratkó-grandchildren.
• With unchanged pension parameters the number of expected years house-
holds spend as a pensioner rise. As a result, the present value of the
pension incomes compared to the wage at age 60 is 30.9 % higher for
the 2006-10 cohort than for the 1951-55 cohort.
• The reduction of the accrual rate by 10 percentage points, increasing
the retirement age by 5 years, the introduction of price indexation and
the 5 percentage point higher social contribution rate in itself can only
slow down the rise of the pension expenditures per GDP, but in the long
run cannot stop it. Introducing the first three reforms together triggers
an immediate 3.64 % GDP-proportional balance-improving effect and
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can ensure the balance of the pension system until 2041-45. Only if
supplemented with the rising contribution rate can they keep the bal-
ance in the long run (with an immediate 6% improvement).
• The price of the shrinking burden, the social security entails to the gov-
ernment is the increasing old age poverty, which is measured as the
expected present value of pension incomes at age 60 compared to the
wages. In case of the multiple reforms, the reduction can reach a 36-
42% loss compared to the baseline scenario.
• Implementing all the reforms increases the effective working hours by
5.11 %, the GDP by 8.09 %, the consumption by 5.35 %, the wealth
by 9.5 %, the capital by 8.3 % by 2066-70 compared to the baseline
scenario, and the foreign debt rate can be moderated by 2.08 percent-
age points. Without increasing the social contribution rate the macroe-
conomic effects can be even more favourable, but the balance of the
pension system improves less.
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